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Abstract
In recent years, significant advances have been made in the realm of in vitro diagnostics
with the development of novel tests which are able to meaningfully impact the course of
a patients' disease management. This transformation has strained the traditional in vitro
diagnostic business model and raised questions as to whether the economics support the
commercial development of these tests.
The goal of this study is to evaluate the economics of in vitro diagnostics from
development to commercialization, with a focus on a specific a class of novel and
complex tests called In Vitro Diagnostic Multivariate Index Assays (IVDMIA). My
hypothesis is that the current dynamics of the market can only sustain a small number of
such novel tests. To evaluate this hypothesis, I construct an economic model of the
development of a hypothetical new in vitro diagnostics which focuses on both the cost of
development and commercialization together with market potential and adoption. The
analysis reviews specific break-even scenarios to determine the parameters which would
allow for an economically viable complex in vitro diagnostic.
The conclusion I reach based on this analysis is that only a very small number of medical
conditions could economically support the development of a novel in vitro diagnostic.
The medical conditions which could support the development of a novel test are
governed by complexity, severity and prevalence of the disease. Given the dramatic
impact these new tests may have on disease management, incentives may be required to
offset the risks associated with expanding novel diagnostics into smaller but medically
significant disease areas.
Thesis Advisor: Ernst Berndt, Ph.D
Title: Louis E. Seley Professor in Applied Economics
Thesis Advisor: Mark Trusheim
Title: Executive in Residence and Visiting Scientist
Acknowledgements
Over the past three years I have had the fortune and privilege to be guided by an
outstanding group of mentors from across MIT, Harvard and the Biomedical Enterprise
Program. Their experiences and insights, which they have generously been willing to
share with me, have given me an amazing foundation to address the challenges I face as
both a student and a professional.
I would like to express my special gratitude and appreciation to Prof. Ernst Berndt and
Mark Trusheim for their support and advice in the development of my thesis. Their
incredible generosity, knowledge and drive to address the challenges of the complex
healthcare industry inspired me to expand my own thinking in the field.
Thank you to the faculty, staff and fellow students at MIT, Harvard Medical School and
the Biomedical Enterprise Program. My fellow students in the Biomedical Enterprise
Program provided an amazing foundation of experiences and interests which continues to
motivate me academically, professionally and personally. I would also like to give a
special acknowledgement to Teo Dagi and Stan Lapidus, who provided a window into the
world of healthcare entrepreneurship along with guidance for how that world might
influence both my thesis and professional goals.
Table of Contents
Abstract ........................................................................................................... .......... 2
A cknow ledgem ents...................................................................................................... 3
Table of Contents ............................................................. .................. .... ............. 4
List of Figures ......... ....................................................................................................... 5
List of Tables .................................................. 5
Section I: Introduction ................................................................................................. 6
Section II: IVD M arket Characteristics ..................................................................... 8
Section III: Trends in M olecular Diagnostics ..................................................................... 9
Section IV : Industry Barriers ........................................................... .............................. 11
A . Regulatory................................................................................................................ 11
B. Physician Behavior............................................ .................................................. 15
C. Reim bursem ent .............................................. ..................................................... 16
D . Intellectual Property.......................................... .................................................. 17
E. Pharm aceutical Industry .............................................................. ........................ 18
Section IV : Econom ic M odel...........................................................19
A . M ethodology ................................................. ...................................................... 19
1. Genom ic Health Case Study .......................................................................... 20
2. XDx Case Study............................................ ................................................... 29
B. Integrated Dynam ic Financial M odel.............................................. 32
Section V : Conclusion ......................................................... ................................... 41
Appendix 1 - Integrated Complex Diagnostic Model ........................................ .... . 43
Appendix 2 - Genom ic Health Forecast M odel ....................................... ...... ... 44
Appendix 3 - Interview s........................................... ................................................... 45
References .............. ...................................................................................................... 53
List of Figures
Figure 1 - Growth of Publications Related to Diagnostics......................................... 9
Figure 2 - Growth of Genetic Based Tests ........................................ ............. 10
Figure 3 - Annual Deal Activity (acquisitions, financing and alliances) ...................... 11
Figure 4 - Genomic Health Product and Financing History'................................... . 22
Figure 5 - Genomic Health Operating Expenses................................. ........... 22
Figure 6 - Genomic Health Product Penetration and Revenue Generation................... 23
Figure 7 - Genomic Health Financial Forecast ....................................... .......... 26
Figure 8 - Market Value of Genomic Health ........................................ ........... 28
Figure 9 - XDx Product Development and Financing History'................................. 30
Figure 10 - XDx Operating Expenses ......................................... ................ 31
Figure 11 - XDx Market Penetration and Revenue Generation' .................................. 32
Figure 12 - M arket Penetration Curves ............................................................................ 34
Figure 13 - Impact of Assumptions on the Potential Size of the Target Population
Necessary to Achieve the Expected Returns on Capital ................................................ 40
List of Tables
Table 1 - Gene Expression Companies ..................................... ..... ............... 19
Table 2 - Genomic Health Financial Model Assumption ..................................... . 25
Table 3 - Key M odel Assumptions ......................................................................... 33
Table 4 - Break-Even Analysis ............................................................................. 35
Table 5 - Incidence by Cancer Type ...................................................................... 36
Table 6 - NVP ($m) Sensitivities to Changes in Post and Pre-IPO Discount Rates........ 37
Table 7 - NPV ($m) Sensitivities to Decreases in SG&A Costs as a Percentage of
Current Costs and Changes in Post-IPO Discount Rates .................................................. 38
Table 8 - NPV ($m) Sensitivities to Decreases in R&D Costs as a Percentage of Current
Costs and Changes in Post-IPO Discount Rates ....................................... ......... 39
Section I: Introduction
In vitro diagnostics (IVD) are comprised of reagents, instruments, systems and
supporting materials used to analyze the content of extracted samples of interest in the
process of a medical diagnosis.' The realm of IVD has traditionally been a commodity
type market with prices of diagnostic tests typically providing their makers with small
margins.2 As these tests evolve and begin to help physicians make better informed
decisions, there is a sense in the healthcare industry that focus will shift from therapeutics
to diagnostics. With greater emphasis on being able to use drugs more effectively,
developers of novel IVDs are emphasizing a need to utilize the same pricing model that
to date has been reserved for proprietary therapeutics, high margins based on the back of
high development costs.3
The IVD market began to change in the early to mid 1990s, when the technology for
molecular diagnostics started to become validated for use in the clinical laboratory.
Molecular diagnostics technology essentially uses genetic material (DNA, RNA) to make
clinical decisions. While the technology had been common in research laboratories for
many decades, it took time to become readily available in the clinic.1,4
But the complexity of these molecular tests and their higher cost of development
compared to traditional chemistry in vitro diagnostics have created a challenge for their
developers. How to position these tests in the traditional IVD world of high volume and
low margin? While there are a number of successful commercialized molecular
diagnostics, one can argue that the number of failures and the degree of advancement
have not lived up to expectations. It was pointed out by Steve Burrill, who heads the
venture capital firm Burrill & Company, "that approximately 70% of the decisions made
by physicians in the USA are based on the results of a diagnostic test, yet only 2% of the
US$2 trillion spent annually on healthcare goes to diagnostics." 3 Current market
dynamics and government regulations do not provide the necessary incentives to expedite
the development of complex diagnostic tests as they do for the drug industry.5 Even
though these complex tests have the potential to dramatically impact the standard of care,
they may only be economically viable in a small number of therapeutic areas.
An example of one of the complex molecular tests to become available commercially is
the recent development of gene expression signatures. These tests measure levels of gene
expression and compare them with a gene expression signature previously validated to
predict the likelihood of an event. Industry veterans such as Brook Byers, a partner at
venture capital firm Kleiner, Perkins, Caulfield & Byers, view these new startups as the
latest generation of molecular diagnostic companies. While original companies such as
Gen-Probe and Roche Diagnostics were focused on providing innovations in detection
technologies, the latest generation is focused on discovering markers and validating their
biology and clinical utility.6 It is the financial analysis of newly formed private and
public companies based on this technology which will provide the basis for evaluating
the economic viability of a company focused on developing and commercializing
complex diagnostics.
In order to evaluate the validity of the hypothesis that complex tests are economically
viable in only a small number of therapeutic areas, my analyses will leverage financial
models to evaluate the economic impact of developing and commercializing gene
expression signature type products in various scenarios. Model parameters will be based
on case studies from the gene expression diagnostic market and qualitative interviews
with industry experts. While selection of case studies will be based on business model
and the availability of public information, the qualitative interviews will be used to
supplement the case studies and provide insights on areas for potential sensitivity
analyses.
Breakeven analysis will illustrate the economic potential for stand alone development and
commercialization and incorporate the sensitivities of specific parameters. Key levers
will also be included to demonstrate the impacts of potential policies or shifts in market
dynamics.
Section II: IVD Market Characteristics
In 2007, the global IVD market was estimated to be approximately $42 billion with the
largest volume share consisting of routine test segments (chemistry/immunoassay
workstations, hematology and routine microbiology) which account for 70% of the tests
performed and 29% of the dollar value of the IVD market. Other categories and their
share of the 2007 dollar value include point-of-care (OTC diabetes 18%, OTC other 2%,
Professional/Hospital 11%), other immunoassays (15%), molecular (13%),
histology/cytology (6%), flow cytometry (2%), coagulation (2%) and blood
grouping/typing (1%). 7 While molecular tests make up a relatively small share of the
total market, they are projected to grow at a compound annual growth rate of 17 percent
from 2007 to 2012 compared to 6 percent for the overall IVD market in the US." 8 While
the IVD market is sizable, it remains a fraction of the global pharmaceutical market
which was over $712 billion in 2007.9
During 2007, in the US, the majority of in vitro diagnostics were performed in the
hospital-affiliated laboratories and accounted for 57% of dollars spent. The remaining
portion was performed at reference laboratories and physician-office laboratories, which
accounted for 38% and 5% of dollar expenditures, respectfully. Of these tests, percent of
revenues consists of 70% routine, 10% esoteric, 2% affiliated with clinical trials, and the
remaining 18% with anatomic pathology and cytology.'0
Section III: Trends in Molecular Diagnostics
The growth potential for molecular diagnostics can be analyzed by tracking leading
indicators over time -- growth of scientific publications and actual available tests -- both
of which have increased dramatically over the past years. (See Figures 1 and 2)
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While these trends have translated to substantial sales growth for molecular diagnostics,
there is the potential for much higher levels of adoption. Many of the concerns which are
limiting the adoption of molecular diagnostics may be the same concerns that have
limited the capital markets in an area with so much potential. Deal activity in the IVD
market has been relatively flat, expect for a few large transactions in 2006 and 2007
which were driven by high flying credit markets. Activity in the molecular space has
only trended up modestly over the past years. 13 (See Figure 3)
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Section IV: Industry Barriers
A. Regulatory
Potential costs and uncertainties regarding future policies are a major barrier to the
introduction of new products. Currently, the type and magnitude of regulatory oversight
depends on the classification of the test with the two categories being either a homebrew
test or a kit. The homebrew test is a test developed by a single laboratory and offered as
a service by that laboratory. A kit is defined as a complete medical device allowing the
clinical site to perform its own assay. Ultimately, it is the test maker who decides
between commercializing its technology as a homebrew test, a kit, or both.
Companies marketing test kits are regulated by the FDA while laboratory-developed tests
(LDTs) are regulated by the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services under the Clinical
Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA). Companies seeking to develop new tests
must validate them in house. The degree of validation varies according to the type of
--I~ C--~ ~ -- ~-----a ---------~
regulation. Homebrew and analyte specific reagents (ASR) have stringent validation
requirements and even 510(k) cleared tests must be validated by the laboratory.
Validation of the assay or an instrument in the clinical setting is also an expensive
proposition for molecular IVD companies. In addition, the submission of supporting
documentation and response to inquires generated by the regulatory review can further
add to expenses. Regulatory delays largely determine the speed with which a successful
research initiative can be commercialized.
Typically, multiple clinical trials are required with large case and control subgroups in
diverse population before clinically valid data can be obtained. On top of the basic
testing expenses, the capital expenditures involved in establishing high quality
genotyping facilities, building the infrastructure required for banking large volumes of
DNA samples, hiring or outsourcing personnel for patient recruitment, and creating
extensive databases for analysis are financially burdensome.
As previously mentioned, there are validation and quality standards which must be met
by the laboratory, but these requirements are typically minimal compared to a full FDA
approval which is required for a kit. So while using a homebrew or an analtye specific
reagent (ASR), which is how almost all genetic tests are currently utilized, provides the
company with a quicker path to commercialization, the market potential is typically
limited by a single reference laboratory status and lack of FDA clinical validation. In
addition, greater scrutiny by regulators may lead to new regulations limiting the future
utilization of the homebrew.1,4,10, 1
6
In the past, diagnostic companies have offered packages of analyte specific reagents to
laboratories which regulators are starting to reclassify as kits. Roche, one of the leading
diagnostic testing companies, first began selling their AmpliChip CYP450 in 2003 as an
ASR. The test uses a gene chip made by Affymetrix and looks for mutations in two
genes that are involved in metabolizing up to 25 percent of existing drugs. But the FDA
stated that the test appeared to be a complete medical device that should have gone
through its 510(k) or PMA regulatory approval process. At the time, Murray Lumpkin,
principal associate commissioner of the FDA, said the agency wants to review tests that
would be widely distributed. "If a test is going to be used for patient-management
decisions or quarantine decisions or isolation decisions, those are tests we'd consider
significant. We believe people ought to have confidence in the test that's being used."
Roche was forced to seek FDA approval, which it eventually obtained over a year later.14
While the FDA has taken steps to assert its authority and impose its validation standards
on what it considers significant tests, they are still in the process of working through and
clarifying guidelines for their own involvement. This process has been complicated by
the fact that there are now over a thousand genetic tests for specific diseases which have
been developed and are being utilized as homebrew tests. Many or most of these tests are
being offered by academic labs or hospital systems like the Mayo Clinic.12 The result has
been various degrees of regulatory review by the FDA culminating in only a handful of
home-brew tests being designated as medical devices and therefore subject to regulatory
approval. The FDA official in charge of evaluating diagnostic tests, Steve Gutnam, has
stated "we believe that those tests that meet the criteria of medical devices are subject to
FDA regulations, but because of limited resources, we have applied our enforcement
discretion." 15
More recently, the FDA has been focusing their efforts on how they should regulate tests
that use proprietary algorithms to predict risk. These tests typically use gene expression
signatures to provide a predictive measure of clinical outcomes. The FDA names these
tests In Vitro Diagnostic Multivariate Index Assays (IVDMIA) and defines them as those
which 1) Combine the values of multiple variables using an interpretation function to
yield a single, patient-specific result (e.g. a "classification," "score," "index," etc.)
intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation,
treatment or prevention of disease; and 2) Provides a result whose derivation is non-
transparent and cannot be independently derived or verified by the end user.16
The process of defining the role of regulatory review for IVDMIAs began over three
years ago and has yet to be finalized. Starting in September 2006, the FDA issued draft
guidance on IVD Multivariate Index Assays in which they defined the characteristics of
the test and discussed regulatory approval pathways. In February 2007, FDA held a
public meeting on IVD multivariate index assays and in May published a class II special
controls guidance document: gene expression profiling test system for breast cancer
prognosis. This published guidance document was based on the FDA February 2007
approval of Agendia's gene expression test Mammaprint for assessing the risk that a
breast tumor will spread to other parts of the body, which represents the first FDA
approved IVDMIA. In July 2007, the FDA released the latest version of IVD
Multivariate Index Assay guidance document.16 Even though the FDA has yet to finalize
IVDMIA guidelines, it has approved two more IVDMIAs in 2008. The first of these was
the Tissue of Origin Test which is used to facilitate diagnosis of tumors that are difficult
to identify and the second is AlloMap which is used to identify heart-transplant recipients
who might be at risk of organ rejection. 17 ,18 While some companies are using the FDA
pathway to validate their tests to the medical community, they were all sold as homebrew
tests prior to FDA approval, and others such as Genomic Health with their Oncotype Dx
test have not sought FDA approval and enjoyed widespread adoption and commercial
success. The FDA's In Vitro Diagnostic Multivariate Index Assays (IVDMIAs) initiative
is causing uncertainty in the industry and after several years has yet to be resolved. 19,20
B. Physician Behavior
A significant barrier in the adoption of complex tests is the lack of education, training and
awareness among healthcare providers. Molecular tests require specialized training to
interpret and implement the test results. Many physicians do not have the appropriate
knowledge with regard to the features and benefits of these tests or basic knowledge and
understanding of probability and statistics.1, 2 1 While awareness should increase over
time, the complexities of these tests are likely to increase as well.
Another barrier to physician adoption is the alignment of incentives and how the
physician and/or their institution are reimbursed. Some tests are disruptive technologies
and would replace a procedure that the prescribing physician or institution would
otherwise be paid to perform. While not necessarily unique to molecular tests, their
potential to expand into novel diagnostic areas versus providing an incremental
improvement to existing tests can make this a significant concern. The result is that
greater clinical validation and marketing efforts may be required to overcome a
misalignment of incentives. Such arguments have been used by industry experts to
outline potential challenges faced by XDx and their gene expression test AlloMap which
has the potential to displace biopsy procedures performed by heart transplant physicians
during the care of their post-transplant patients.
C. Reimbursement
The diagnostics sector within health care has traditionally been a high volume and low
margin industry. In this context, it is challenging for novel IVD tests to command a
premium price. The main barriers to premium pricing are the legacy issues surrounding
reimbursement. To counter fraud in the early 1980s, reimbursement became based on
procedures and not outcomes. This has created a perverse incentive within the diagnostic
community. 21 Under the current reimbursement scheme, the more procedures it takes to
achieve an outcome, the greater the total potential reimbursement to the laboratory
performing those procedures. In the context of such incentives, from the financial
perspective, why would a laboratory then adapt a technology which would lower the total
number of procedures given that the actual reimbursement to the laboratory might
decrease?
Reimbursement for molecular diagnostics depends on the following: a current procedural
terminology (CPT) code to identify the test, evidence in the medical literature to support
a particular technology platform or a biomarker's clinical validity, the type of insurance
that a patient carries, and establishment of equitable payment rates to reflect added value.
While tests lacking CPT codes can still be reimbursed using unlisted codes, they have a
greater chance of being denied payment or of being required to provide additional
documentation. To apply for a new CPT code, an IVD manufacturer must demonstrate
that the test has regulatory approval (if required), is clinically significant, and is used in a
wide geographic region. In addition, in most insurance policies, a CPT code needs to
match a specific code from the International Classification of Diseases, ninth revision
(ICD-9) in order for a claim to be paid. For most companies, this becomes a very time
consuming process with very uncertain outcomes.
22
,
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The result is that the developers of novel complex IVDs are approaching payers directly
to make the case for their products and to encourage them to utilize unlisted codes to
charge for these tests. But this is also a very time consuming and uncertain process
which requires a substantial amount of clinical data. Not only must the company's data
demonstrate benefits in clinical outcomes but it might also need to include health
economic studies to justify a premium price to payers. 3
D. Intellectual Property
Protecting intellectual property in the realm of diagnostics can be more difficult than
compared to pharmaceuticals. Many components of these technologies are in the area of
devices and as such are subject to greater work-around risks. Various ways to measure
the same analyte can compete directly. In addition, even a molecular based IP can be
side stepped by identifying and using another analyte with the same predictive value. So
while IP protection has been a key point of concern in the realm of traditional
diagnostics, its relative importance is not yet clear in the case of genetic based tests.
David Margulies, the CEO of genetic testing company Correlagen Diagnostics stated, "IP
is not any more or less of an issue for me than it would be for a pharmaceutical company.
There is nothing more definitive than your genetic sequence." Others such as Brad Gray
of Genzyme Genetics feel that for companies relying on developing tests based on gene
expression signatures, the potential for a better combination of genes is always a potential
threat.
E. Pharmaceutical Industry
The traditional large pharmaceutical company has been understandably hesitant to
embrace the advent of molecular diagnostics and its potential to segment patient
populations into smaller groups, given that its model is based on the "blockbuster"
phenomenon, in which case one drug fits all. The dramatic profits driven by these
products historically have been the basis of substantial pharmaceutical research and
development efforts and many advances in the industry. In addition, these
pharmaceutical companies are fearful of the additional complexity that might be created
by combining both test and drug. The greater complexity might slow adoption rates of
newly launched drugs which traditionally are rapidly utilized by physicians. The
pressures to maximize the drugs' profitability during its limited patent life and justify the
returns of large R&D projects have slowed the acceptance and adoption of complex tests
by pharmaceutical companies, one of the largest commercial entities in the healthcare
industry.21 25 While this has generally been true for most large pharmaceutical companies
in the past, many of these companies are now moving to adopt new business models
given the dearth of "blockbuster" pipeline products and the proven success of
personalized medicines such as Herceptin. 25
Section IV: Economic Model
A. Methodology
In this thesis, company case studies are used as the foundation to develop a dynamic
financial model which can evaluate the economic conditions that would allow for the
successful development and commercialization of a complex IVD. Currently, the most
complex of these are the gene signature expression tests which are classified by the FDA
as In Vitro Diagnostic Multivariate Index Assays (IVDMIA). These tests measure the
expression levels of numerous genes at a point in time to create a predictive score of a
specific clinical outcome. While companies are developing such tests in various disease
areas, the main therapeutic classes appear to be cancer and transplantation. The table
below lists select companies focusing on gene signature expression tests. (See Table 1)
Table 1 - Gene Expression Companies 26
Gene Expression Diagnostic Companies Test Status
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Of these companies, the two companies with the greatest success in selling gene
expression tests have been Genomic Health and XDx. Both companies have a substantial
amount of publicly available information given that Genomic Health is a publicly listed
company and XDx filed for an IPO in 2007. In addition, the two companies represent
different business models in the testing space; Genomic Health offers a one-time test to
identify the best course of treatment for breast cancer patients, while XDx offers a routine
test designed to monitor if a patient is experiencing acute rejection. The combination of
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the companies' relative success in selling tests, substantial amount of publicly available
information and different testing models will provide a strong foundation to the
development of insights into the potential success of these types of tests in the current
market.2 7,2 8
1. Genomic Health Case Study
Background
Genomic Health is a life science company that develops and markets genomics based
diagnostic tests that provide predictive outcomes to support physician treatment
decisions. The company has focused on the development of diagnostic tests for cancer
and currently has one product on the market, Oncotype DX for early stage, estrogen
receptor and lymph node negative breast cancer. The test is an assay that measures the
expression of a set of 21 genes in tumor tissue. These 21 genes were chosen from 250
candidate genes that were thought to be linked to breast cancer. Oncotype DX
distinguishes between breast cancer patients with a low or high risk of disease recurrence.
The value proposition is that this test enables physicians to more reliably prescribe
chemotherapy to those patients most likely to benefit and avoid it in those patients not
likely to benefit. In order to position itself successfully with third party payers, the
company has conducted pharmacoeconomic studies to show that Oncotype DX could
significantly reduce costs and prolong patient survival. The list price of the test is
currently $3,975, which is 15% higher than when the company first launched the product.
While the company is developing other diagnostic tests for cancer, these diagnostics are
still in relatively early stages and Genomic Health has instead focused on label expansion
for its current product to include estrogen receptor and lymph node positive breast
cancer.
27,29
Overall, the company has performed various studies to establish the relationship between
Oncotype DX recurrence score (RS) and the benefit of chemotherapy, measured as
disease recurrence free survival (DRFS). In one key validation study, the Oncotype DX
assay was performed on 651 specimens from patients treated with tamoxifen plus
chemotherapy. The key finding was that patients in the high risk category, as defined by
their RS, experienced a significant benefit from chemotherapy while patients in the low
risk category experienced minimal, if any, benefit from chemotherapy. About 60% and
88% of patients in the high risk category who were treated with tamoxifen alone or
tamoxifen plus chemotherapy, respectively, were disease free after 10 years. This
represents a mean absolute decrease in the rate of disease recurrence of approximately
28%, with a standard error of 8%. In contrast, about 97% and 96% of patients in the low
risk category who were treated with tamoxifen alone or tamoxifen plus chemotherapy,
respectively, were disease free after 10 years. This represents a mean absolute decrease
in the rate of disease recurrence of about (1)% with a standard error of 2%.30
Founded in 2000, the company has gone through numerous rounds of financing during
the course of developing and commercializing Oncotype DX. As an early mover in this
field, the company has benefited from relationships with academic tissue banks and
publications in prestigious journals including the New England Journal of Medicine.
More recently, Oncotype DX was included in the American Society of Clinical Oncology
Guidelines. (See Figure 4)
Figure 4 - Genomic Health Product and Financing History3 1,32
Product Development
Study results in Clinical Guidelines
21 genes NEJM Recommendations*selected from 447 pts (ER+, N-) 12/04 10/07250 candidate enrolled in 3
genes retrospective studies- Oncotype DX Initiate
parafinn fixed Launched TAILORx Pfizer
Company samples 1/04 4/06 partnership 1/08
Founded
'00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08
Investor Rounds $58.6M $53.6M
IPO secondary
Public 10/05 5107
Private $7.9M $5M $5M $2M $27.7M
12100 4/01 3/02 11/02 2/04
$29M $2.4M $24.6M
1/01 5/02 12/04
Genomics Health's apparent success has come at a price. While it has spent a significant
amount on research and development, it is now spending significantly more on the selling
and marketing of Oncotype DX. While this might not be vastly different from traditional
pharmaceutical or diagnostic companies, it does raise the question of sustainability given
the company's single product platform. (See Figure 5)
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The company argues that these expenses are justified as revenues have grown
dramatically over the past few years and market penetration is reported to have reached
an unprecedented 38% in 2008 with over 39,600 test reports delivered for use in
treatment. But my forecasts predict that even with continued strong performance, the
return on initial capital will be below expectations unless it can grow the market through
label expansion or the introduction of additional tests. (See Figure 6)
Figure 6 - Genomic Health Product Penetration and Revenue Generation"27
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Utilizing historical analysis and assumptions regarding future performance, a forecast
model was generated to evaluate the financial value being created for the company
through the future sales and marketing of Oncotype DX. This value is then compared to
the public market valuation for the company to provide a basis for comparison and
investigation of the different perceptions around the potential value of a company
developing and commercializing a complex diagnostic.
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A discounted cash flow methodology was used as the key valuation technique to
determine the present value of the cash flows being generated by Genomics Health and
their sales of Oncotype DX. The assumptions driving the discounted cash flow model are
listed below. The foundation of the model is the idea that Oncotype DX is the only test
Genomic Health will successfully develop and commercialize. While this might be
considered a significant limitation on the company's potential, is will allow for a focused
approach to the valuation of the company and its activities. In addition, while the
company does have other products in development, there has been little progress made
over the last few years and their path to validation and commercialization remains highly
uncertain.2 7,32 In order to offset for no impact of additional products, all R&D expenses
are removed as a going concern, even though the company continues to clinically validate
Oncotype DX to expand the utilization of the product.
Other assumptions driving the financial model are listed below and while they were
designed with the goal of providing an expected outcome, any one of these assumptions
can dramatically impact the company's valuation. One critical assumption is the market
size of the target population. Currently, this is limited to the test's labeling for early stage
node negative (N-) and estrogen receptor positive (ER+) patients, but given that this
represents less than half of the breast cancer patients each year, there is the potential for
expansion through off-label utilization by physicians. Potential market share is another
area with the potential to create dramatic shifts in valuation, with the impact of a large
field of competitors potentially offset by Genomic Health's first-mover advantage.7
Assumptions for SG&A represent margins below the Company's 2008 margins of 25%
for Cost of Product, 42% for Selling and Marketing and 23% for General and
Administrative. While there could be potential to drive these costs lower, this would
likely come with trade offs such as a lower market share. Lastly, the discount rate is
modeled for that of an established profitable company, so while this could be considered
generous given the company's current stage, it provides for the expected long-term
success of the company. 33 (See Table 2)
Table 2 - Genomic Health Financial Model Assumption
Variable Assumption
Market Size Limited to breast cancer pts with early stage node negative (N-) and
estrogen receptor positive (ER+)
Patients Tested Grows to 95% of patients after 9 years on market
Market Share Decreases by 5% per year and then 10% per year after 10 years on
market
Test Price Increases with inflation
Reimbursement rate Increases to 90% in 4 years
Cost of product revenues Decreases to 20% of product revenues
Research and development No expenses - no market expansion
Selling and marketing Decreases to 30% of product revenues
General and administrative Decreases to 20% of product revenues
Discount rate 10% for public equity
Combining the above assumptions with the current sales performance of the product and
the financials of Genomic Health, I generated a financial forecast. The forecast provides
the basis for the discounted cash flow model and the culminating net present value of
cash flows. (See Figure 7)
Figure 7 - Genomic Health Financial Forecast
Year 2008A 2009E 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E
Revenue Model
Breast cancer diagnosis (female)
Growth rate of diagnosis
% pts: N-, ER+
Addressable population
% pts tested
Competition share (MamaPrint, Celera, etc.)
Growth of competition share
Oncotype DX share
Oncotype DX units
Price per unit
Rate of price increase
Reimbursement rate
Product revenues
Operating Expenses
Cost of product revenues
% of product revenue
Research and development
% of product revenue
Selling and marketing
% of product revenue
General and administrative
% of product revenue
Total operating expenses
% of product revenue
Cash flow
Discount rate
Discounted cash flow
243 245 248 250 253 255
1.0%
41%
100
45%
10%
5%
90%
40
3,735
2.5%
73%
110,678
101
55%
15%
(change to
85%
47
3,828
102
65%
20%
10% after
80%
53
3,924
103
75%
25%
10 yrs on
75%
58
4,022
104
85%
30%
market)
70%
62
4,123
105
95%
35%
65%
65
4,226
80% 85% 90% 90% 90%
144,028 176,215 208,944 228,807 245,830
27,185 28,806 35,243 41,789
25% 20% 20% 20%
46,
25,
99,
11,
11,
0% 0%
668 43,208
42% 30%
617 28,806
23% 20%
470 100,819
90% 70%
208 43,208
10%
208
0% 0%
52,864 62,683
30% 30%
35,243 41,789
20% 20%
123,350 146,261
70% 70%
52,864 62,683
45,761
20%
49,166
20%
0% 0%
68,642 73,749
30% 30%
45,761 49,166
20% 20%
160,165 172,081
70% 70%
68,642 73,749
35,709 39,718 42,813 42,621 41,629
10 year product life
NPV of cash flows
Net debt
Total NPV
202,491
54,631
257,122
15 year product life
NPV of cash flows
Net debt
Total NPV
Note: Values in $ (000) except for 'price per unit'
Source: Author's Calculations
The above forecast illustrates five-year projections starting in 2009 with the actual
financials provided for 2008. Having initially launched the test in 2004 and assuming a
ten-year product life for Oncotype DX, the NPV of projected cash flows up to year 2013
is calculated to be $257 million. When assuming a fifteen-year product life, the NPV of
cash flows up to year 2018 is $365 million. In both cases, the company's current cash
position contributes a substantial portion of the total valuation.
310,718
54,631
365,349
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Public Market Expectations
Genomic Health's market capitalization of $553 million on Jan 1st 2009 is significantly
greater than the net present value of projected cash flows of $257-365 million (depending
on product life) indicating that the market view of the company's economic potential is
significantly higher than what a discounted cash flow analysis of their currently marketed
product would indicate. While there are numerous potential reasons for this discrepancy,
the review of analyst reports and company public releases points to an expectation that
Genomic Health will be able to grow its product line through label expansion of
Oncotype DX within breast cancer to patients with early stage node negative (N+) and
estrogen receptor positive (ER+) test results, and to develop novel diagnostics in
additional therapeutic areas such as pancreatic cancer.
"It is crucial for Genomic Health to develop new products in order to sustain its long-
term growth. We think Genomic Health is continuing to make considerable progress in
this regard, not only in new product development, but also in enhancing the utility of
Oncotype DX for breast cancer that is likely to increase demand." George Zavoico, PhD
(Cantor Fitzgerald, 7-May-2008) 34
While expanding the label for Oncotype DX within breast cancer represents a significant
opportunity to increase both revenues and profitability, it is unclear what the impact of
developing additional tests targeting other cancers will have on the bottom line. The
reasons for this is that the format of test development and commercialization would be
comparable to the development path of Oncotype DX given that the company has not
developed a platform technology but instead has only a stand-alone process. The
development of a new gene expression test would require the company to again perform
each step and assume the same costs it did for Oncotype DX from the collection of tissue
samples, gene selection, clinical validation, and all the way through to an additional sales
force targeting the relevant oncology specialists.
Even while future returns to current investors in Genomic Health are still very much up
for debate, the returns to early pre-IPO investors may have been substantial depending on
the timing of their exit and which round of financing they were involved with. At the
time pre-IPO investors were allowed to sell their shares (lock-up period was six months
post IPO), public filings indicate that the market value for their share of the company
provided an approximate 2x return on the total pre-IPO investment. This incorporates the
impact of a $52 million investment a year before the IPO which accounted for over half
of the total pre-IPO investment of $104 million provide over a five year period. (See
Figure 8)
Figure 8 - Market Value of Genomic Health35
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For Genomic Health, the public markets provided early investors with a critical avenue
for monetizing the value of their investments. This public market opportunity is an
important incentive for early investors in companies with novel technologies because it
provides them with a tool to manage their expected returns in relationship to the risks
associated with the long-term challenges outlined earlier.
2. XDx Case Study
Another company used as a platform to develop an integrated dynamic financial model is
XDx. Much like Genomic Health, the company uses levels of gene expression as a
clinical predictive tool. Unlike Genomic Health, the company is using the technology to
develop tests to monitor the immune system.
XDx currently markets one product, AlloMap HTx, a molecular expression test for the
detection of acute rejection in heart transplant patients. The value proposition of the test
is that it allows physicians to diagnose whether a heart transplant patient is having an
acute rejection episode by using a blood sample instead of the physician conducting a
biopsy of the heart. The minimally invasive nature of the gene expression test eliminates
potential procedure complications and minimizes patient discomfort. XDx has performed
various studies to validate the test and is currently conducting a prospective study to
verify the effectiveness of the test when compared directly with the use of biopsies. Like
Genomic Health, the company has performed health economic studies to demonstrate the
cost effectiveness of the test to third party payers. 36
Founded in 1999, XDx has gone through numerous capital raising events, but it currently
remains private even though the company did file a S 1 back in October of 2007 in
anticipation of an initial public offering (IPO). Since then, XDx has put its IPO
application on hold and in August 2009 completed another round of private fund raising
which is expected to allow the company to achieve break-even status in 2010.37 Given its
status as a private company, analysis of the company's financials is primarily limited to
its SEC filings completed in anticipation of an IPO in 2008.
In addition to validating the effectiveness of its heart transplant test, XDx is also
developing tests for determining acute rejection in lung transplant patients and a test to
monitor lupus. Both of these tests are in early stages of development and for the purpose
of this analysis the costs and potential returns are excluded. (See Figure 9)
Figure 9 - XDx Product Development and Financing History3 1 '36
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While the sizes of their patient populations are relatively small, these tests would benefit
by the fact that they would be used to monitor the patient multiple times, generating
numerous tests per patient. But with a price of $2,950 per test, utilization is likely to be
limited to targeted differential diagnosis events, much like biopsies, instead of a truly
routine diagnostic. As a result, AlloMap HTx's market is small and concentrated with a
few specialized physicians. Approximately 2,200 heart transplants occur each year in the
US and these patients generally only receive protocol biopsies in the first year.38 But
even with such a concentrated market, XDx has spent a significant amount on research
and development even compared to Genomic Health which is targeting a market of
-100,000 breast cancer node negative estrogen positive and attempting to expand into
node positive estrogen positive patients. (See Figure 10)
Figure 10 - XDx Operating Expenses"
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When comparing the cost structures of Genomic Health and XDx, it appears that while
both companies are able to adjust their SG&A depending on the market they focus on and
achieve comparable penetration rates, the costs associated with product development are
relatively consistent across markets for complex tests. (See Figure 11)
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Figure 11 - XDx Market Penetration and Revenue Generation"6""
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B. Integrated Dynamic Financial Model
A baseline net present value (NPV) financial model was developed to evaluate the case
for developing and commercializing a complex diagnostic gene expression test. The
model is populated through industry benchmarks identified in the Genomic Health and
XDx cases along with inputs from literature review and qualitative interviews. A detailed
layout of the model is provided in Appendix 1.
The model was used to evaluate the following key issues: 1) given a base case (most
likely scenario), in what types of markets would the development of gene expression tests
be economically viable? and 2) what are the economic sensitivities to the critical inputs
with a focus on inputs which could potentially be targeted to accelerate the development
of these tests?
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A selection of assumptions used to generate the model is listed in the table below. (See
Table 3)
Table 3 - Key Model Assumptions
Variable Assumption
Frequency of capital raising events Annual
Years to IPO 5
Years to product launch 5
Frequency of test Once per patient
Peak market share
High 80%
Medium 60%
Low 40%
Years to peak share 5 years after product launch
Test Price $3,500
Peak reimbursement rate 90%
Years to peak reimbursement rate 6 years after product launch
Costs
Cost of product revenues Decreases to 20% of product revenues
Research and development Fixed at Genomic Health type levels for 7 years
Selling and marketing Decreases to 30% of product revenues and are
capped at a maximum of $50 million
General and administrative Decreases to 20% of product revenues and are
capped at a maximum of $20 million
Discount Rates
Pre-IPO 25%
Post -IPO 10%
A critical input of the model is the penetration curves driving the revenue generated by
the product. While a successful traditional IVD test might achieve peak market shares of
20-30%, the market for complex proprietary gene expression products appears to be
governed by more binary outcomes, either they are successful or they are not. This may
be due to the high associated costs of development and commercialization, and the
phenomenon that companies will either cut their losses or aggressively commercialize the
test. Another consideration is that both Genomic Health's Oncotype DX and XDx's
AlloMap HTx are novel diagnostics targeting the creation of a new diagnostic market and
not a follow-on diagnostic able to outperform an existing test through greater accuracy,
speed and/or cost. To reflect this industry shift, it is expected that a successfully
launched complex diagnostic will achieve relatively high market penetration curves even
in the lower case scenarios. (See Figure 12)
Figure 12 - Market Penetration Curves
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Other assumptions, including the timing of events and operating margins, are based
primarily on observations and a comparative analysis of historical developments at
Genomic Health and XDx. While any assumptions derived from Genomic Health could
be considered a best case scenario given its comparative success relative to XDx or
others, it provides a clear example of what is achievable for a company aiming to develop
and commercialize a complex diagnostic.
Based on the combination of these assumptions, NPV break-even analysis was performed
to determine the number of patients a complex diagnostic test would need to target in
order to provide the capital investors with their expected returns. (See Table 4)
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Table 4 - Break-Even Analysis
Penetration Curve
Low Medium High
Number of Patients 196 125 91
(thousands)
Even in the high penetration curve scenario which allows for a peak penetration of 80%
of the total market, over ninety-one thousand patients are needed to provide expected
returns to investors. If the basis of this test is a one-time predictive test to evaluate the
course of treatment for a cancer patient, then there are only a handful of cancer types
which could support the development and commercialization of a gene signature test.
The table below lists 2004 CDC estimates of various cancer incidence rates. The only
cancer populations with high enough incidence levels to support the development of a
one-time gene signature prognostic test are lung, prostrate, breast and colon cancer.
While a new test might have the potential to work across different cancer types it may
also be limited to a sub-group of a specific cancer. If a test is able to achieve this cross-
cancer versatility, it would allow the developer to achieve the critical number of patients
while still targeting the lower incidence cancers. 39 (See Table 5)
Table 5 - Incidence by Cancer Type
Cancer Tve Incidence
Lung and Bronchus 196,252
Prostate 189,075
Male and Female Breast 188,587
Female Breast 186,772
Colon excluding Rectum 105,694
Urinary Bladder 62,092
Non-Hodgkin Lymphoma 55,442
Melanomas of the Skin 50,039
Miscellaneous 48,431
Male and Female Breast, <i>in situ</i> 45,145
Female Breast, <i>in situ</i> 44,905
Kidney and Renal Pelvis 41,524
Rectum and Rectosigmoid Junction 39,389
Corpus 35,790
Pancreas 32,570
Thyroid 26,975
Stomach 20,151
Ovary 20,095
Brain 17,930
Liver and Intrahepatic Bile Duct 16,580
Myeloma 15,759
Esophagus 14,675
Larynx 11,995
Cervix 11,892
Chronic Lymphocytic 10,915
Acute Myeloid 10,294
Soft Tissue including Heart 8,917
Tongue 8,295
Hodgkin Lymphoma 7,945.
Testis 7,579
Small Intestine 5,479
Tonsil 4,795
Other Biliary 4,729
Other Leukemias 4,716
Cancer Type Incidence
Gum and Other Mouth 4,465
Anus, Anal Canal and Anorectum 4,445
Acute Lymphocytic 4,216
Other Non-Epithelial Skin 4,147
Chronic Myeloid 4,023
Vulva 3,631
Salivary Gland 3,445
Gallbladder 3,221
Mesothelioma 3,035
Bones and Joints 2,604
Eye and Orbit 2,334
Hypopharynx 2,231
Other Endocrine including Thymus 2,044
Floor of Mouth 1,979
Lip 1,966
Nose, Nasal Cavity and Middle Ear 1,943
Peritoneum, Omentum and Mesentery 1,809
Ureter 1,651
Nasopharynx 1,578
Cranial Nerves and Other Nervous System 1,332
Oropharynx 1,325
Kaposi Sarcoma 1,245
Uterus, NOS 1,191
Vagina 1,130
Retroperitoneum 1,064
Other Female Genital Organs 1,059
Other Digestive Organs 1,016
Penis 1,001
Other Oral Cavity and Pharynx 741
Other Urinary Organs 717
Trachea and Other Respiratory Organs 562
Other Male Genital Organs 276
Pleura 99
In order to evaluate the potential to expand the economic viability of these tests beyond
just those classes of cancer patients with over one hundred thousand patients, sensitivities
were run on the cost of capital assumptions. Pre-IPO funding is associated with venture
capital (VC) expected cost of capital, which is typically very high. The actual range of
returns identified by Doug Levinson of Flagship Ventures is very broad with VC funds
looking to invest in projects expected to generate 5-15x cash-on-cash returns in the next
five years.40
Post-IPO funding is associated with the equity markets and the cost of capital for more
established companies. The lower the discount rate is in both cases, the greater the NPV
and the potential that developing these tests for smaller populations will be economically
viable. The table below illustrates the NPV sensitivities around the two different
discount rates for a patient population of one hundred thousand and a high adoption
curve. Both discount rates have a substantial impact on NPVs with the post-IPO discount
rate demonstrating the greatest sensitivity given the extended period of cash flows it
incorporates. (See Table 6)
Table 6 - NVP ($m) Sensitivities to Changes in Post and Pre-IPO Discount Rates
Post-IPO Discount Rate
Cash-on-
Cash
Return 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15%
1.3 x 5% 191 167 145 125 106 89 73 59 45 32 21
1.6 x 10% 143 124 107 91 76 63 50 38 27 17 8
2.0 x 15% 107 92 78 65 53 43 32 23 14 6 -1
2.5 x 20% 80 67 56 46 36 27 19 12 5 -2 -8
Pre-IPO 3.1 x 25% 59 49 39 31 23 16 9 3 -2 -8 -13Discount
Rate 3.7 x 30% 42 34 27 20 13 7 2 -3 -8 -12 -16
4.5 x 35% 29 23 16 11 5 1 -4 -8 -12 -16 -19
5.4 x 40% 19 14 9 4 -1 -5 -8 -12 -15 -18 -21
6.4 x 45% 12 7 2 -2 -5 -9 -12 -15 -18 -20 -22
7.6 x 50% 5 1 -2 -6 -9 -12 -15 -17 -19 -21 -23
Another potential benefit of having the commercialization process brought into a larger
and established organization is the potential for synergies and their associated cost
savings, especially with selling, marketing, general and administration activities. While
the companies developing gene expression tests often tout the potential for follow-on
tests driving higher margins as they exploit their established infrastructure, the
internalization of these companies by the larger diagnostic company would insure those
cost savings right from the beginning. The table below illustrates the NPV sensitivities
around potential SG&A cost savings and the impact of lower discount rates using a
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patient population of one hundred thousand and a high adoption curve. Potential SG&A
cost savings appear to be nearly as significant as the pre-IPO discount rate on the NPVs
generated by the test. (See Table 7)
Table 7 - NPV ($m) Sensitivities to Decreases in SG&A Costs as a Percentage of
Current Costs and Changes in Post-IPO Discount Rates
Post-IPO Discount Rate
5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15%
5% 67 57 47 39 30 23 16 10 4 -2 -7
10% 76 65 55 46 38 30 23 16 10 5 -1
15% 84 73 63 54 45 37 30 23 17 11 5
SG&A 20% 93 81 71 61 52 44 36 29 23 17 11
Discount 25% 101 89 79 69 59 51 43 36 29 23 17From
Potential 30% 110 97 86 76 67 58 50 43 36 29 23
Acquisition 35% 118 106 94 84 74 65 57 49 42 36 29
40% 126 114 102 91 81 72 64 56 48 42 35
45% 135 122 110 99 88 79 70 62 55 48 42
50% 143 130 118 106 96 86 77 69 61 54 47
Returns to investors will also be influenced by the potential for the company to develop
the test with public and/or private assistance. This may come in the form of government
grants or in partnerships with pharmaceutical companies to develop tests in conjunction
with the development and promotion of therapeutics. One example of this is Genomic
Health's partnership with Pfizer in 2008 to develop a genomic test to estimate the risk of
recurrence following surgery for patients with Stage I-III renal carcinoma (clear cell type)
that has not spread to other parts of the body. The table below illustrates the NPV
sensitivities around the potential to lower R&D costs for the developer via such
programs. The analysis indicates that the impact is not as significant as the pre-IPO
discount rate and SG&A cost savings - findings driven by the relatively shorter period
and expected sums involved. The benefits of such programs may, however, be
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understated by the NPV analysis given its potential to minimize the costs associated with
programs that fail in development prior to reaching the market. (See Table 8)
Table 8 - NPV ($m) Sensitivities to Decreases in R&D Costs as a Percentage of Current
Costs and Changes in Post-IPO Discount Rates
Post-IPO Discount Rate
R&D
Discount
From
Potential
Colla-
borations
Even though the above analysis helps to illustrate the impact of specific assumptions on
the ability of a test to achieve expected returns for the investors, it is difficult to
meaningfully compare these drivers by strictly looking at the dollars being generated. To
create a comparable analysis, specific ranges for each variable are utilized to illustrate
how each variable impacts the break-even size of the target population for the test. (See
Figure 13)
5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15%
% 60 50 41 33 25 18 11 5 -1 -6 -11
% 62 52 43 35 27 20 13 7 1 -4 -9
% 64 54 45 36 29 21 15 9 3 -2 -7
% 65 56 46 38 30 23 17 10 5 0 -5
% 67 57 48 40 32 25 18 12 7 1 -4
% 69 59 50 42 34 27 20 14 8 3 -2
% 71 61 52 43 36 29 22 16 10 5 0
% 72 63 53 45 37 30 24 18 12 7 2
% 74 64 55 47 39 32 26 19 14 9 4
% 76 66 57 49 41 34 27 21 16 10 6
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Figure 13 - Impact of Assumptions on the Potential Size of the Target Population
Necessary to Achieve the Expected Returns on Capital
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The comparative analysis demonstrates how changing the post-IPO discount rate from
5% to 15% dramatically shifts the size of the target population needed to achieve the
investors expected return from seventy-five thousand to one hundred and nine thousand
patients. While the influence of expected returns expressed through the respective
discount rates is arguably expected, the potential impact of strategic considerations such
as merging with existing diagnostic companies to lower SG&A costs and lowering R&D
expenses through public and private collaborations can be significant.
The analysis provided by this integrated dynamic financial model provides a framework
for evaluating the financial potential for developing and commercializing novel in vitro
diagnostics targeting specific therapeutic areas, along with illustrating the critical
considerations influencing the model's outcome. While useful to evaluate the potential
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impact of strategic decisions within the context of the proposed scenario, this analysis
raises additional considerations when expanding the scenario to include the potential for
multi-product development and public and private partnerships that may be able to
manage the risks of development and commercialization. This analysis therefore
illustrates the importance of expanding the current framework and base scenario in order
to provide test developers with the necessary economic incentives to target smaller
patient populations with significant medical need.
To expand on this work, a review of the types and scope of potential public and private
partnerships utilized in the diagnostic and possibly other industries would provide a
foundation for developing a more robust and flexible model able to incorporate the
influence of third parties. In addition, expanding the model to incorporate the longer-
term influence of internally developing follow-on products (e.g. five years after
launching Oncotype Dx, Genomic Health has yet to launch another test) on financial
returns and therefore the potential for the company target smaller patient populations.
Section V: Conclusion
The high cost of effectively developing and marketing novel in vitro diagnostics will
limit the growth in the number of complex IVD diagnostics, especially those associated
with gene expression profiling, to large patient segments with high medical need. In the
near term, the only potential path to expanding the reach of these types of tests into new
therapeutic areas is the involvement of larger diagnostic companies with their lower cost
of capital and the potential to generate cost savings. Specifically, it is the high SG&A
costs associated with the newly formed companies which appear to retain the greatest
opportunity to lower costs. Larger diagnostics companies may be able to utilize
resources across a larger product portfolio to minimize the burden of SG&A costs
currently shouldered by these smaller one product companies. In the long term, greater
payer acceptance, higher levels of physician adoption and clear approval and validation
standards all have the potential to expand the complex tests across different patient
populations.
Appendix 1 - Integrated Complex Diagnostic Model
The table below illustrates the line items for the baseline net present value (NPV)
financial model used to determine the maximum size of a target population able to
provide the expected returns for investors.
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Appendix 3 - Interviews
Mara Aspinall - President, Genzyme Genetics, July 1 2007
Feels that the convergence of therapeutics and diagnostics is essential and inevitable
given the drive to increase outcomes at lower costs. The main driver of potential cost
savings comes from the fact that while therapeutics can be effective, they are actually
effective for only a small percentage of patients. This is where the benefits of diagnostics
could significantly shift the current cost-benefit equation. Significant savings could be
generated through effective diagnostics by increasing the percentage of patients treated
effectively the first time. Direct savings would be generated by decreasing the number of
visits to physicians and by eliminating the use of ineffective therapies along with the
numerous benefits to the patients associated with rapid effective treatment.
To facilitate the development of such diagnostics, Mara put forth the hypothesis that a
similar model to that of the pharmaceutical industry will need to be developed for the
diagnostic industry. A key component of this model is the high level of regulation
driving the high cost of product development. The regulatory hurdles themselves provide
significant barriers to entry that incentivizes companies to commit the resources need to
development such expensive tests. In her view, government regulatory bodies need to
increase the regulation of the diagnostic market. It is her belief that the development of
diagnostics would need to follow a similar model to that of traditional therapeutics.
Brad Grey - Vice President of Business Development, Genzyme Genetics, August 15
2007
The company is experiencing greater interest on the part of pharmaceutical companies to
partner with us to help them develop, market and deliver the needed tests to identify
patient segments for their targeted medicines, especially in the oncology field. The
structure of these agreements is critical in order to provide the proper incentives to
develop these tests while the drug is in development. This is needed so that the test can
be integrated into the drug's clinical development along with providing a dual launch of
the test and the drug. Speed to market and convenience of the test are conflicting aspects
to our business model. As a centralized testing service, we are able to develop highly
accurate tests rapidly and make them available to the general market. Our partners on the
other hand, while needing rapid time to market, would like to have the test available in a
kit format that have be used conveniently across all labs. Kits are outside the scope of
our business model and this might result in an agreement that provides us with a period of
exclusivity before the launch of a competing diagnostic kit into the market.
Stan Lapidus - CEO, Helicos Biosciences, December 20 2007
Significant opportunities exist with the current market only scratching the surface. The
main catalyst will be the advent of the $1,000 genome, opening the market to the general
population and providing the basis for expanding available tests.
Sees regulatory bodies as the main barrier to development of this market. Notes that the
cigarette industry, which is proven to kill people, is less regulated than diagnostics
(although this may now change given FDA gaining authority in 2009 to regulate
tobacco). Lifestyle tests may prove an initial opportunity given the ability to minimize
the impact of these regulatory and reimbursement concerns.
David Margulies - CEO, Correlagen, January 8 2008
The primary concerns for this developing market are pricing, reimbursement and
increasing complexity and scope of tests. As the market expands as expected, the cost on
the system will be severe. He makes an analogy with what happened to drugs in the
late70s and 80s. During this period, the rapid increase in drug costs and utilization
brought about the creation of Pharmacy Benefits Managers (PBMs) to act as
intermediaries between drug manufacturers and health plans. Responsibilities included
processing and paying prescription drug claims, developing and maintaining the
formulary, contracting with pharmacies, and negotiating discounts and rebates with drug
manufacturers. Imagines a similar type of service evolving for molecular diagnostics as
volume and prices increase.
Does not see similar barriers with regards to IP and regulations. Use patents provide a
strong protection and given the complexity and rapid expansion of diagnostics, it would
be nearly impossible for a government entity to regulate. Removing the CLIA escape
clause is just not likely to happen given the time it would take the government to regulate
accordingly and the desire of physicians to protect their space.
Doug Levinson - Partner, Flagship Ventures, January 15 2008
While high growth areas are in molecular/genetic tests, he sees the market segmenting by
location of the test. The lab/clinic is a small margin business focused on high through-
put tests that are able to work on the current platform and off established analytes. In this
setting, molecular diagnostics could provide benefits of speed and menu expansion. A
very difficult setting to overcome the established incentive structures.
It is when we move to point-of-care testing that things become more interesting. The test
will need to be as good as central hospital labs. Key opportunities exist outside the
hospital such as 1-minute clinics where speed and accuracy are essential. In these
settings, the significant value assigned to speed should be able to overcome any
established incentive structures which typically delay or limit the adoption of a new test.
Another potential segment which is not as restricted by established incentive structures is
life-style tests.
Risks associated with the development of a molecular test are not as studied as pharma
and create the additional barrier of developing new markets. Also difficult to know if to
develop a technology or content story and which one will hold up best. The opportunities
provided by testing for drug trials are limited when the value is in a broad screening test.
Incorporating the risks associated with development, venture capital would need to target
returns of 10-15x for an earlier stage investment. Even in circumstances for which the
risks may be better understood and managed, an expected return could not be less than
5x. Approximately 5 years to monetize the investment would be expected with a
potential range of 4-6 years.
Eugene Chiu - Co-Founder/VP Business Development, Predictive Bioscience,
February 21 2008
Emphasizes the importance of reimbursement to his company and the difficulties
associated with the system. There is a need to transition the market from procedure based
pricing to creating an economic case for premium priced diagnostics. While evidence
based medicine is starting to happen, a dramatic change in medical practice still needs to
occur before it becomes a reality. Until this happens, developers of novel based tests will
need to work within the confines of the CPT coding system to establish pricing and
payment for their tests. The ultimate design of a test can depend not on the needs of the
user and patient but on the reimbursement framework.
Jon Symonds - Managing Director, Goldman Sachs, December 2 2008
There has been a dramatic withdrawal of capital from the industry that has occurred
during the last decade or so and whether it is through declining multiples or increased
return of cash that has been forced on the industry.
From a macro perspective, innovation is the single most important root of economic
growth and wealth creation. Most innovation is incremental and it is extraordinary to
think about, in context of healthcare, where this industry is going and what it has
achieved. All the benefits of innovation are welcomed but stakeholders are not prepared
to pay for it. Risk, costs and requirements of return of innovation are under greater
pressure - capital has and is being withdrawn.
To some extent, the industry brings these issues on themselves, looking at large players
and their R&D descriptions, all looking for similar therapeutic areas. Society will
continue to benefit from this, breakthroughs are bound to be found but equally it will be
at the expense of financial returns. These have deteriorated dramatically over the last
decade.
So what is the value of R&D? Traditionally, people used to think about scientific
innovation as researchers being driven by progress and producing a product, while
patients were relatively passive in this world and trusted physicians due to lack of
information. Being the investor, all you had to do was to add up number of Phase III
compounds and extrapolate what has been achieved in the past. Not surprisingly, huge
returns would accrue with those with the biggest pipelines.
Today research is in a very different position. Research is genuinely focused on
differentiating medicines that improve clinical outcomes. Regulators also looking at
clinical outcomes and want the answer in ever increasing population sizes. Payers want
to get an efficient outcome at acceptable risk. Investors want to see transparent financial
returns and know what the value of investment will be. Outcome is increasingly in focus.
It is very clear that the shape of products the industry is looking for is changing, the days
of mass marketed products is significantly under threat. Generics will increase
dramatically. Industry needs to focus on targeted medicines.
What then are the criteria of success for driving financial returns? Generics will become
default prescriptions. Why pay a multiple of a generic price if only marginal benefit is
demonstrated in clinical trials with a few thousand people? Consequences are that the
economic proposition of investing in primary care is pretty weak and returns are going to
continue to diminish. Therefore, if there is a solution, it has to be in targeted medicines.
Diagnostics, biomarkers and medtech in combination with the molecules offers
segmentation. It is clear that having a good molecule is not enough and for payers, the
ability to prove improved health outcomes across lager population is something worth
paying for. If this can be demonstrated to a larger extent, returns and rewards to that
R&D will be high, attracting new investments into the industry.
Seamus Fernandez - Managing Director, Leerink Swann, February 19 2009
Large pharmaceutical companies are now focusing on generating returns through mega
mergers and the cost savings associated with these transactions. While the promise of
personalized medicine has been on the horizon for some time, slow progress has been
made to date, and R&D productivity continues to fall. Of the large pharmaceutical
companies, Roche has aggressively moved to develop an integrated drug and diagnostic
model by bringing together both disciplines under one roof. But even with all these
efforts, it still seems these disciplines are far from integrated. For Roche, this may
change as the new CEO, Severin Schwan, came up through the diagnostics division and
could provide the needed emphasis to make it work.
Matthew Sabel - Portfolio Manger, Fidelity Investments, March 20 2009
For healthcare investors, these types of assets are risky and do not provide the same type
of exposure associated with even riskier assets such as early stage biotech companies.
The space does not provide the scale needed to attract the same amount of equity research
coverage in comparison to biotech companies, while still including a similar level of
scientific risk. The potential risks associated with the development and
commercialization of complex diagnostics are not well defined in comparison to drugs,
minimizing the potential for portfolio management to effectively manage returns. In
comparison, for early stage drug companies, there is a high risk / high reward profile that
is punctuated by key development milestones creating clear inflection points. Active
investors are willing to pile in and out of these stocks around these inflection points
providing the liquidity and volatility investors seek. For those targeting less volatile
returns, the breadth of these assets can allow for a portfolio management approach able to
manage risk and returns through the combination of companies with products at diverse
stages of development, therapeutic focus and drug mechanisms.
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